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Children often fail to control variables when conducting tests 
of hypotheses, yielding confounded evidence. We propose that 
getting children to think of alternative possibilities through 
counterfactual prompts may scaffold their ability to control 
variables, by engaging them in an imagined intervention that is 
structurally similar to controlled actions in scientific 
experiments. Findings provide preliminary support for this 
hypothesis. Seven- to 10-year-olds who were prompted to think 
counterfactually showed better performance on post-test 
control of variables tasks than children who were given control 
prompts. These results inform debates about the contribution 
of counterfactual reasoning to scientific reasoning, and suggest 
that counterfactual prompts may be useful in science learning 
contexts.  
Keywords: cognitive development; scientific reasoning; 
counterfactual reasoning; causal learning; science education 
Scientific Reasoning in Development 
Equipping children with scientific inquiry skills is a core 
objective of elementary science education, allowing children 
to collect evidence and draw inferences about the world 
around them. However, extensive research has found that 
children are relatively unequipped to engage in many aspects 
of scientific inquiry in the absence of direct instruction and 
frequent scaffolding (Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993; Klahr & 
Nigam, 2004; Kuhn & Franklin, 2006; Schauble, 1996). In 
the present study, drawing from research and theory in 
cognitive development, science education, and philosophy, 
we investigate the use of a novel pedagogical tool – 
counterfactual reasoning prompts – to scaffold children’s 
scientific reasoning skills.  
An important sub-skill of scientific inquiry is the ability to 
control variables. This skill, termed the control-of-variables 
strategy (CVS) has received a great deal of attention in 
research on scientific reasoning over the past four decades 
(for a review, see Zimmerman, 2007). To properly execute 
this skill, the learner should isolate a single variable at a time, 
while holding all else constant.  
Consider a common task used in studies investigating CVS 
(e.g., Chen & Klahr, 1999; Klahr & Nigam, 2004). Children 
are presented with a set of ramps that can be varied along a 
number of dimensions (e.g., ramp height, surface, run length, 
ball size) and their task is to manipulate the ramps to 
determine the effect of different variables on where a ball 
stops after rolling down the ramp. To make warranted 
inferences about individual variables, the learner should 
change the values of a single variable (e.g., compare a high 
ramp to a low ramp), keeping all other variables constant 
(e.g., smooth surface, same-size balls).  
Although children are able to recognize a conclusive test 
of a hypothesis as young as age 6 (Sodian, Zaitchik, & Carey, 
1991), they typically fail to produce one themselves in the 
absence of scaffolding through middle childhood (Klahr, 
Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011; Zimmerman, 2007). However, 
with direct instruction, children often show improvement in 
their ability to design controlled experiments (Chen & Klahr, 
1999; Klahr & Nigam, 2004; for a meta-analysis, see 
Schwichow, Croker, Zimmerman, Hoffler, & Hartig, 2016). 
For instance, Chen and Klahr (1999) found that 7- to 10-
years-old who were given explicit instruction on CVS were 
better able to transfer this strategy to both similar and 
dissimilar problems than those who engaged in self-guided 
inquiry. Younger children frequently failed to design 
unconfounded tests.  
Although past studies have found that children are able to 
learn the control of variables strategy through direct 
instruction or demonstrations, science curricula and 
educational guidelines often recommend teaching scientific 
inquiry skills through inquiry-based learning instead (e.g., 
US National Research Council, 2000). That is, children’s 
scientific inquiry skills are thought to be best supported by 
having children explore science concepts based on their own 
  
observations and experiences with phenomena of interest, 
with little explicit instruction from educators. Thus, there is 
significant educational value to identifying methods for 
scaffolding children’s hypothesis testing abilities that not 
only fit within these curricular guidelines, but also harness 
children’s intuitive reasoning skills.  
Causal and Counterfactual Reasoning 
Whereas the work reviewed above suggests that older 
children are poor at testing and revising hypotheses, another 
body of research shows that children are adept at parallel 
skills when engaging in causal learning tasks.   
 From a young age, children form, test, and revise 
hypotheses in building informal theories in various domains 
(Carey, 1985; Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Bryant, 1997; Keil, 
1992;). For instance, toddlers are able to infer higher-order 
relational causes (Walker & Gopnik, 2014). Preschoolers are 
able to draw appropriate causal inferences from patterns of 
dependence, even when evidence conflicts with their prior 
knowledge (Schulz & Gopnik, 2004), and use evidence from 
interventions to make inferences about causal structure 
(Schulz, Glymour, & Gopnik, 2007). 
Why do older children (and even adults) fail when applying 
this skill-set in scientific reasoning contexts? We suggest a 
few possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, studies 
of intuitive causal reasoning with toddlers and preschoolers 
use tasks that are typically decontextualized, placing 
relatively few demands on children's prior knowledge. Many 
of these studies rely on a “blicket detector” paradigm, in 
which children are familiarized with a novel machine, and 
their task is to determine what makes it switch on (Gopnik & 
Sobel, 2000). In contrast, scientific reasoning tasks given to 
older children typically use knowledge-laden tasks that rely 
heavily on children’s existing (and often incorrect) 
knowledge and theories (e.g., Chen & Klahr, 1999). Second, 
causal reasoning tasks typically measure children’s abilities 
implicitly, whereas scientific reasoning tasks ask children to 
explicitly plan and often verbally demonstrate their abilities. 
Despite these differences, both classes of studies rely on a 
common set of domain-general inferential skills, including 
the ability to form and revise hypotheses on the basis of 
available evidence.  
How do we connect the parallel mechanisms children 
successfully apply in causal reasoning tasks to scientific 
reasoning contexts? In the current study, we explore the claim 
that counterfactual reasoning is fundamental to causal and 
scientific reasoning, and suggest that counterfactual prompts 
may help to connect these abilities. When we think 
counterfactually, we compare the way things are to the way 
things could have been. Counterfactual reasoning therefore 
necessarily involves thinking about causes: As one considers 
how an event could have turned out differently, one reasons 
about the causal relationship between an antecedent and 
outcome. If the event X had not happened, would event Y still 
have happened? If the answer to this is “no”, one can 
conclude that event X is a cause of event Y (Lewis, 1986).  
However, the utility of counterfactual reasoning may not 
be limited to drawing specific causal inferences. Several 
researchers have drawn theoretical parallels between the 
mechanisms underlying counterfactual reasoning and 
scientific reasoning (e.g., Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & 
Gopnik, 2012; Erb & Sobel, 2014; Gopnik & Walker, 2013; 
Sloman, 2005; Rafetseder & Perner, 2014; Walker & Gopnik, 
2013). If a learner believes that X caused Y, they can 
mentally intervene on X by imagining that it did not occur, 
follow the causal implications of this change, and then reason 
about whether it would have led to a change in Y (Gopnik & 
Walker, 2013; Walker & Gopnik, 2013). We follow an 
identical process in scientific reasoning. We hypothesize that 
X causes Y, and then make plans to systematically 
manipulate X in order to investigate its impact on Y. In both 
counterfactual and scientific reasoning, the learner adjusts a 
causal system by (mentally or physically) intervening on one 
event and considering the effects of this change.  
Despite the proposed contribution of counterfactual 
reasoning to science learning, there is relatively little research 
connecting the two (Engle & Walker, 2018; Frosch, 
McCormack, Lagnado, & Burns, 2012; Schulz, et al., 2007) 
and no work linking these capacities to hypothesis testing in 
children. Only two previous studies to our knowledge have 
investigated the relationship between counterfactual 
reasoning and scientific inquiry. Adults primed with 
counterfactuals were better able to conduct a disconfirming 
test of a hypothesis than those given neutral primes (Galinsky 
& Moskowitz, 2000). In another study, counterfactual 
prompts scaffolded children’s ability to detect anomalies to 
an existing hypothesis in a causal learning task (Engle and 
Walker, 2018). 
Given that counterfactual and scientific reasoning both 
involve intervening on a single variable to investigate its 
causal role in an outcome of interest, we propose that 
engaging children in counterfactual reasoning during a 
control-of-variables task will scaffold their ability to conduct 
a controlled test of a hypothesis by activating a parallel 
underlying cognitive mechanism.  
That said, it is worth first considering whether children of 
the age we tested in the current study (7 to 10 years) are 
capable of counterfactual reasoning, given the lively debate 
about its developmental trajectory. Previous research has 
been mixed, with some findings indicating that children can 
reason counterfactually as young as 3-½ years (Harris, 
German, & Mills, 1996), and other work suggesting that this 
ability does not reach maturity until adolescence (e.g., 
Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013). However, more 
recent work suggests that studies showing counterfactual 
reasoning to be late-developing may have underestimated 
children’s ability by presenting opaque causal structures and 
by placing large demands on children’s memory 
(McCormack, Ho, Gribben, O’Connor, & Hoerl (2018; 
Nyhout, Henke, & Ganea, 2019). A recent set of studies 
demonstrates that children reason counterfactually by age 4 
when given a clear and novel causal structure that does not 
  
rely on their background knowledge (Nyhout & Ganea, 
2019). Thus, we conclude from these findings that children 
have the requisite abilities to engage in counterfactual 
reasoning well before the age of those in the current study.  
Current Study 
In contrast to previous research (Chen & Klahr, 1999; Klahr 
& Nigam, 2004), we investigated whether children’s ability 
to control variables could be scaffolded in non-school 
settings. We also reduced task demands by including a 
smaller number of variables (2 variables, rather than 4).  
Children in the present study were assigned to either a 
counterfactual or control condition. After watching a video of 
an actor conducting a controlled test of a hypothesis, children 
were given either a counterfactual prompt, asking them to 
consider what would happen if the actor had conducted her 
test differently, or a control prompt, in which children were 
asked to recall what had happened. We predicted that 
children given counterfactual prompts would be more likely 
to improve from pre-test to post-test than children given 
control prompts. We tested a range of ages typically used in 
CVS research (7 to 10 years), but did not have prior 
predictions about age-related differences in performance.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants aged 7 to 10 years of age were recruited and 
tested at a museum in a large urban area. The final sample 
included 88 children (M = 8.91, SD = 1.13, range = 7.00 to 
10.97, 45 girls) whose data are reported below. Participants 
were placed in two categories, based on their age. The 
younger age category included children between the ages of 
7.00 and 8.99 (n = 46, M = 8.00, SD = 0.63) and the older age 
category included children between the ages of 9.00 to 10.99 
(n = 42, M = 9.90, SD = 0.59), with categories selected on the 
basis of similar previous studies (e.g., Chen & Klahr, 1999; 
Klahr & Nigam, 2004). Participants who passed the pre-test 
phase (n = 24) were excluded as they were determined to be 
already competent with CVS. Three additional participants 
were excluded due to experimenter error (n = 2) or language 
barriers (n = 1).  
Materials 
For the pre- and post-test phases described below, 
participants were given two identical ramps with both a 
down- and up-ramp side. The ramps were ridged on the up-
ramp where the ball could stop (Figure 1). Each ridge was 
painted a different color to allow for unambiguous reference 
and measurement. There were four binary variables, but 
participants received only two of the four variables at a time, 
and the remaining two variables were “fixed”. The variables 
were paired as follows: (1) height (high or low) and ball size 
(large or small), or (2) starting place (top or middle), and 
surface (rough or smooth). For instance, at one time-point, 
participants were given a large and small ball for each ramp, 
and pieces to adjust the steepness of each ramp (“high” or  
 
Figure 1: One of two identical ramps used in the 
study. A ball is launched from the down-ramp (left) 
and stops on one of the coloured ridges on the up-
ramp (right). The apparatus can be adjusted for 
height, surface type, where the ball starts on the 
down-ramp, and ball size.  
 
“low”). At the other time-point, participants were given a 
rough surface and smooth surface for each ramp, and a piece 
of cardboard to adjust where the ball started for each.  
The same set of ramps were used in a video in the 
scaffolding phase, displayed for participants on a laptop.  
Procedure 
The study included a warm-up activity (uncertainty training) 
followed by pre-test, scaffolding, and two post-test phases. 
Participants were assigned to one of two conditions for the 
scaffolding phase: counterfactual (n = 45, M age = 8.47, 23 
girls) or control (n = 43, M age = 8.44, 22 female girls). The 
order of all variables and variable sets were counterbalanced 
between participants.  
 
Uncertainty Training. Given that some of the prompts in the 
intervention phase required children to acknowledge their 
uncertainty about an outcome, we included an uncertainty 
training phase to ensure children were able to recognize and 
acknowledge their uncertainty. All children, regardless of 
condition, received the same uncertainty training. Using 
cards with various colors and suits, the experimenter placed 
a pair of cards face down, and turned over one card. Before 
revealing the second card, she asked the participant if they 
could be “sure or not sure” if the face-down card was the 
same or different as the face-up card. Regardless of the 
participant’s response, the experimenter instructed children 
that they cannot be sure if the two cards are the same, and that 
it is okay to answer the question in this way. The process 
repeated until the participants answered that they could not 
be sure three times. 
  
Pre-test. The experimenter placed the two ramps next to each 
other, directly in front of the participant, and explained that 
the two ramps were similar and worked the same way. She 
then showed participants how to operate and adjust the ramps 
along two of the variables (e.g. height of ramp and size of 
ball). The other two variables (e.g. ramp surface and run 
length) were fixed and not introduced until the post-test 
transfer phase. Participants were asked to demonstrate how 
to manipulate the ramps. If they did not set up the ramp 
correctly, the experimenter showed them again. All 
  
demonstrations were performed with one ramp, and 
participants were reminded that the ramps were the same.  
To measure children’s ability to execute CVS, the 
experimenter asked them to show how they would find out if 
one variable plays a role in how far the ball travels down the 
ramp (e.g., “Can you show me how you would find out if the 
size of ball matters for how far the ball goes down the 
ramp?”). She told participants they had one chance to set up 
both ramps at the same time, and then repeated the question 
a second time. Participants were required to set up both ramps 
before launching the balls down each ramp one at a time. 
After each ball was launched, the experimenter labeled the 
outcome (e.g., “Look! The ball stopped on the yellow line.”) 
but did not compare between the two ramps.  
Using the same procedure, the experimenter then asked 
participants to determine if a second variable mattered for 
how far the ball would travel down a ramp (e.g., “Can you 
show me how you would find out if the height of the ramp 
matters for how far the ball goes down the ramp?”).  
Participants who controlled the correct variable received 1 
point for each question for a maximum score of 2. 
Participants who received a score of 2/2 at pre-test were 
excluded from the study (and the study was terminated at this 
point), because they already possessed an understanding of 
CVS (n = 24). Participants who received scores of 0 or 1 went 
on to the scaffolding phase.   
 
Scaffolding. Participants in this phase watched two videos of 
an actor exploring the ramps and were told that they would 
be asked about what they saw after each video. The actor in 
the videos manipulated the same two variables that 
participants were asked to isolate during the pre-test, using 
the same ramps. The video started with the actor stating that 
she was going to find out if a variable (e.g., height of the 
ramp) played a role in how far the ball travelled down the 
ramps. The actor then proceeded to set-up the ramps and 
labelled the set-up as she went along (e.g., “I'm going to set 
Ramp 1 to high”). After she set-up both ramps, she launched 
the balls one at a time and labeled the outcome by stating the 
color the ball landed on. At the end of the video she stated 
which ball (on Ramp 1 or Ramp 2) travelled farther. The 
experimenter then paused the video so that the participants 
could see the outcome of both ramps at the same time. The 
videos were identical across conditions; the only difference 
was in the question prompts children were asked after. 
In the counterfactual condition, participants were asked to 
imagine a change to the value of a variable (e.g., "Let’s 
imagine that she set Ramp 1 to low. Would the ball have 
travelled down the ramp farther on Ramp 1, farther on Ramp 
2, or you can't be sure?"). This imagined change would create 
a confounded (or uncontrolled) test. In the control condition, 
participants were asked to recall what had happened (e.g., 
"Let’s imagine again what happened to the ball on Ramp 1? 
Did the ball travel farther on Ramp 1, farther on Ramp 2, or 
you can't be sure?"). Children did not receive feedback on 
their responses during the scaffolding phase in either 
condition.  
In both conditions, a second video was shown highlighting 
the other variable (e.g., size of ball). In the counterfactual 
condition, the experimenter asked the participants to imagine 
a change to the value of this new variable (e.g., size of ball), 
creating another confounded test. In the control condition, the 
experimenter asked the participants the same question as 
before, but highlighted the other ramp (e.g., Ramp 2).  
 
Post-Test Same. The experimenter removed the laptop and 
placed the ramps side-by-side in front of the participant. This 
phase was identical to the pre-test, except participants were 
not asked to demonstrate how the ramps worked. Responses 
were coded in the same way, with participants receiving a 
maximum score of 2.  
 
Post-Test Transfer. The experimenter then told participants 
that the ramps can work in a different way. The two original 
variables were fixed (e.g., ramps could only be set to high, 
and only the big balls could be used) and two new variables 
were introduced (e.g., surface of the ramp and starting 
position for the ball). As in the pre-test, the experimenter 
showed participants how the new variables worked on the 
ramps and asked participants to demonstrate how to 
manipulate each new variable.  
The procedure was the same as the pre-test and post-test 
same phases except participants were asked two new 
questions about each of the new variables (e.g. “Can you 
show me how you would find out if the surface of the 
ramp/where the ball starts on the ramp matters for how far 
the ball goes down the ramp?”). Again, participants could 
receive a score up to 2 across the two test questions.  
In sum, participants were asked two questions each at pre-
test, post-test same, and post-test transfer, and received a 
score between 0 and 2 for the number of controlled tests they 
conducted in each phase. In each counterbalancing order, the 
pre-test and post-test same phases were identical, whereas the 
post-test transfer phase used two previously unencountered 
variables. The experimenter live-recorded with paper-and-
pencil, and later checked videos for accuracy. A second 
researcher coded 34% of videos, and inter-rater reliability 
was excellent (96.6% agreement, Fleiss’ k = 0.93, p < .001).  
Results 
We first tested whether there were differences between the 
two conditions at pre-test using a Chi-Square test of 
independence, and found no significant differences across 
conditions in pre-test score, p = .206. We also found no 
significant differences between genders (U = 926, p = .687) 
or the variable set participants received at pre-test (U = 902, 
p = .522), thus we do not consider these variables further. 
To investigate the change in children’s score (CVS score 
out of 2) from pre-test to (1) post-test same and (2) post-test 
transfer, we conducted two generalized estimating equation 
(GEE) analyses with multinomial distributions and 
cumulative logit-log link functions with condition 
(counterfactual or control) and age group (younger or older) 
as predictor variables.  
  
For the GEE of pre-test vs. post-test same performance, 
there was a main effect of test, B = -2.56, SE = 0.56, Wald 
χ2(1) = 20.84, p < .001, such that children were 12.82 times 
more likely to receive a higher score at post-test same than at 
pre-test, Exp(B) = 0.78, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.23]. There was 
also a main effect of age, B = -1.66, SE = 0.76, Wald χ2(1) = 
4.78., p = .029, such that older children were 5.26 times more 
likely to receive a higher score than younger children, Exp(B) 
= 0.19 95% CI = [0.04, 0.84]. The main effect of condition 
was not significant, p = .436. The test phase by age category 
interaction was significant, B = 1.59, SE = 0.72, Wald χ2(1) 
= 4.85., p = .028, such that older children in the post-test same 
phase were 4.90 times more likely to receive a higher score 
than younger children in the post-test same phase, Exp(B) = 
4.90, 95% CI = 1.19, 20.13] All other interactions were non-
significant.  
For the GEE of pre-test vs. post-test transfer, there was 
again a main effect of test, B = -1.59, SE = 0.51, Wald χ2(1) 
= 9.70, p = .002, such that children were 4.90 times more 
likely to receive a higher score on the post-test transfer phase 
than the pre-test phase, Exp(B) = .204, 95% CI [0.08, 0.55]. 
There was also a main effect of age, B= -1.35, SE = 0.68, 
Wald χ2(1) = 3.92, p = .048, such that older children were 
3.85 times more likely to receive a higher score than younger 
children, Exp(B) = 0.26, 95% CI = [0.069, 0.987]. The main 
effect of condition was marginally significant, B = 1.31, SE 
= 0.67, Wald χ2(1) = 3.819, p = .051. Children in the 
counterfactual condition were 3.71 times more likely to 
receive a higher score than those in the control condition, 
Exp(B) = 3.71, 95% CI = [1.00, 13.78]. All interactions were 
non-significant.  
We conducted planned post-hoc comparisons to further 
investigate performance between groups at each test-phase 
using Chi-square tests of independence. Performance 
differed significantly between children in the counterfactual 
and control conditions at both post-test same 𝟀2(2) = 7.28, p 
= .026 and post-test transfer 𝟀2(2) = 6.04, p = .049. Table 1 
presents the relevant proportions of children who conducted 
0, 1, and 2 controlled tests in each test phase entered into the 
Chi-square analyses.   
 
Table 1: Proportion of children who conducted 0, 1, or 2 
controlled tests in each post-test phase (CVS Score). 
 
  CVS Score (/2) 
Post-test  Condition 0 1 2 
Same Counterfactual 11.1 33.3 55.6 
 Control 34.9 20.9 44.2 
Transfer Counterfactual 24.4 22.2 53.3 
 Control 41.9 30.2 27.9 
Finally, we considered the relation between children’s 
responses to counterfactual prompts in the scaffolding phase 
and their CVS scores, although we did not make predictions 
about any such relation. Recall that the correct answer to the 
counterfactual prompts was “can’t be sure”, because the 
counterfactual intervention created a confounded test. Of the 
45 children in the counterfactual condition, 13 (29%) 
answered “can’t be sure” to both prompts, 19 (42%) 
answered “can’t be sure” to 1/2, and 13 (29%) did not answer 
“can’t be sure” to either prompt. Children’s “can’t be sure” 
responses did not significantly correlate with their 
performance on any of the CVS tests, Spearman’s rho = -.121 
to -.231, p = .127 to .430. 
Discussion 
We proposed that prompting children to think 
counterfactually during a control-of-variables task would 
scaffold their performance by capitalizing on their underlying 
causal reasoning skills. The results of this study provide 
initial support for this proposal. Children given 
counterfactual prompts showed better performance on the 
post-test phases than those given control prompts, though 
these differences were non-significant on post-test same and 
marginally significant on post-test transfer in the omnibus 
analyses. Critically, when considering condition differences 
alone, children in the counterfactual condition performed 
significantly better than those in the control condition at both 
post-tests. The largest proportion of control group children 
scored 0/2 on both post-tests, whereas the largest proportion 
of counterfactual group children scored 2/2, as displayed in 
Table 1. 
Along with these condition differences, there was also an 
indication that the video demonstration alone improved 
children’s ability to control variables, given that we found 
significant main effects of test phase, but no condition by test-
phase interaction. The actor did not explicitly comment on 
the strategies she was using, and the demonstration was 
devoid of ostensive pedagogical signals (Csibra & Gergely, 
2009) that were present in many previous CVS studies 
(Schwichow et al., 2016). Future work may consider the role 
of similar demonstrations and counterfactual prompts 
separately to identify the extent to which they may yield 
different benefits.  
Our findings are surprising in light of previous studies, 
which found that children required more intensive instruction 
and scaffolding in order to improve, with some of these 
interventions even taking place over the course of several 
sessions (e.g., Schauble, 1996). Even with a subtle 
manipulation in the form of two counterfactual questions 
following a demonstration, children showed improvement in 
their ability to conduct a controlled test of a hypothesis. 
Children in the counterfactual condition were able to 
conduct a controlled test both on the variables they had 
already encountered and on two new variables, with more 
than half of children in the counterfactual condition scoring 
2/2 on both post-tests. In contrast, children in the control 
condition showed less evidence of transfer, with a minority 
of children scoring 2/2 in the post-test transfer phase.  
These findings provide preliminary evidence that 
counterfactual prompts may be a promising pedagogical tool 
for supporting CVS. However, these results do not allow us 
to pinpoint the precise mechanism by which counterfactuals 
may confer this benefit. We have suggested that 
  
counterfactuals may serve as imagined interventions, helping 
learners to connect their intuitive causal reasoning abilities to 
the current task. This suggestion is in line with previous work 
emphasizing the relation between causal and counterfactual 
reasoning (e.g., Gopnik & Schulz, 2007; Sloman 2005; 
Gopnik & Walker, 2013).  
However, other work suggests that counterfactuals may 
have a general effect on reasoning by activating a “mindset” 
that is open to alternatives. Previous research shows that 
prompts to consider alternatives in the form of 
counterfactuals (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) or multiple 
explanations (Hirt & Markman, 1995) have wide-reaching 
effects, with individuals showing generally debiased 
reasoning across a range of settings. Researchers studying 
these effects have suggested that counterfactuals activate a 
mental simulation mindset that breaks the reasoner free of a 
singular viewpoint or hypothesis and incites consideration of 
alternative, and potentially contrasting possibilities. In 
ongoing research, we are currently investigating whether 
children prompted with counterfactuals on one task (e.g., 
ramps) show improvement on a far-transfer task (e.g., 
pendulums) to better understand the potential mechanisms by 
which counterfactual prompts may support performance. In 
the present study, our counterfactual questions were about the 
experimental design and specifically pertained to the control-
of-variables process. It is an open question whether 
counterfactual questions about a peripheral or irrelevant 
feature of the task (e.g., the color of the ball) would scaffold 
performance. An alternative “mindset” account would 
predict that counterfactuals should be beneficial regardless of 
their focus. 
Our counterfactual prompts not only focused on the control 
of variables process, but also specifically invited children to 
imagine a confounded test. An alternate explanation for 
children’s success in the counterfactual condition may 
therefore be that by engaging children in imagining a 
confounded test, our prompts led them to recognize that such 
tests were inconclusive and that they should avoid producing 
such tests themselves. However, the lack of a relation 
between children’s “can’t be sure” responses and their ability 
to control variables suggests that children did not need to 
explicitly recognize the inconclusiveness of a confounded 
test in order to benefit from the process of thinking 
counterfactually. In other words, the effect of the 
counterfactual prompts appears to be distinct from the 
specific response they elicit. This finding aligns with research 
on children’s self-explanation showing that the process of 
generating explanations benefits children’s causal reasoning, 
regardless of the specific explanations they produce (e.g., 
Walker, Lombrozo, Legare, & Gopnik, 2014).  
Another possibility is that our counterfactual prompts drew 
children’s attention to both values of the variable that was 
held constant (e.g., "Let’s imagine that she set Ramp 1 to 
low” when she had set both ramps to high), whereas the 
control prompts did not (e.g., "Let’s imagine again what 
happened to the ball on Ramp 1”). This may have made 
children more likely to consider and control the alternate 
variable. In a follow-up study, we have adapted our control 
prompt to highlight both levels of the alternate variable to 
investigate whether this accounts for children’s better 
performance in the counterfactual condition.  
Although we are not yet able to identify the precise 
mechanism by which counterfactuals confer the benefits 
observed, these findings connect to a wider body of results 
that suggest that drawing children’s attention to alternatives 
benefits their scientific inquiry (e.g., Sodian et al, 1991; 
Engle & Walker, 2018). For instance, children in Sodian et 
al. (1991) were able to recognize a conclusive test of a 
hypothesis when presented with two contrasting hypotheses, 
and, as mentioned above, Engle and Walker (2018) found that 
counterfactual prompts scaffolded children’s ability to detect 
anomalies during causal learning. These results suggest that 
thinking of counterfactuals and alternatives may benefit a 
range of scientific inquiry skills. 
Conclusion 
Children prompted to think counterfactually showed 
improvements in their ability to conduct controlled tests of a 
hypothesis – an ability previous studies have suggested 
requires direct instruction or intensive scaffolding. These 
results support theoretical proposals about the role of 
counterfactuals in scientific reasoning, and suggest that 
counterfactuals may have educational utility. The prompts 
used in the current study are short and simple, and could 
easily be implemented in a range of formal and informal 
learning contexts.  
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